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Abstract. We solve the dynamics of the on-line minority game, with general types
of decision noise, using generating functional techniques a la De Dominicis and the
temporal regularization procedure of Bedeaux et al. The result is a macroscopic
dynamical theory in the form of closed equations for correlation- and response functions
defined via an effective continuous-time single-trader process, which are exact in both
the ergodic and in the non-ergodic regime of the minority game. Our solution also
explains why, although one cannot formally truncate the Kramers-Moyal expansion
of the process after the Fokker-Planck term, upon doing so one still finds the correct
solution, that the previously proposed diffusion matrices for the Fokker-Planck term
are incomplete, and how previously proposed approximations of the market volatility
can be traced back to ergodicity assumptions.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 87.23.Ge, 05.70.Ln, 64.60.Ht
1. Introduction
The Minority Game (MG) [1] is an intriguing variation on the so-called El-Farol bar
problem [2] which aims to capture and understand in the simplest possible way the
cooperative phenomena in markets of interacting traders. Its equations describe the
stochastic evolution in time of the selection of individual ‘trading strategies’ by a
community of traders which operate in a simple market. The rules of this market
are that each trader has to make a binary decision at every point in time (e.g. whether
to buy or sell), and that profit is made only by those traders who find themselves in the
minority group (i.e. who find themselves buying when most wish to sell, or vice versa).
The essence of the minority game is that each trader individually wishes to make profit,
but that the net effect of his/her trading actions is defined fully in terms of (or relative
to) the actions taken by the other traders, and that there is a high degree of frustration
since it is impossible for all traders to be successful at the same time. In spite of its
apparent simplicity, the minority game has been found to exhibit non-trivial behaviour
(e.g. phase transitions separating an ergodic from a highly non-ergodic regime) and
to pose a considerable challenge to the theorist. Its (stochastic) equations do not obey
detailed balance, so there is no equilibrium state, and understanding the model properly
inevitably requires solving its dynamics. An overview of the literature on the MG and
its many variations and extensions can be found in [3].
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In the original minority game, the information supplied to the agents upon which
to base their trading decisions consisted of the history of the market. However, it was
realized [4] that the dynamics of the MG remains largely unaltered if, instead of the true
history of the market, random information is supplied to the agents; given α (the relative
number of possible values for the external information), the only relevant condition is
that all agents must be given the same information (whether sensible or otherwise).
This led to a considerable simplification of theoretical approaches to the MG, since it
reduced the process to a Markovian one. In [5] it was shown that the relevant quantities
studied in the minority game can be scaled such that they become independent of the
number of agents N when this number becomes very large, opening up the possibility
to use statistical mechanical tools. An interesting generalization of the game was the
introduction of agents’ decision noise [6], which was shown not only to improve worse
than random behaviour but also, more surprisingly, to be able to make it better than
random‡. The studies [6] and [10] finally paved the way for a number of papers aiming
to develop a solvable statistical mechanical theory.
Early theoretical attempts focused on using additive decision noise to regularize
the microscopic stochastic laws and derive deterministic (non-linear) continous-time
equations, which minimized a Lyapunov function [11, 12]. This approach was remarkably
successful in identifying the location of a phase transition and in describing correctly
some aspects of the behaviour of the minority game above this phase transition.
However, it became clear later that the deterministic equations were only approximate,
even for N → ∞ (since they neglected relevant fluctuations). This initiated a debate
about how to construct exact continuous-time microscopic laws for the minority game
[13, 14, 15, 16, 17], in which all participants restricted themselves to either deterministic
or Fokker-Planck equations (some dealing with both additive and multiplicative decision
noise [15]) but without agreeing on the expression to be used for the diffusion matrix,
and all involving different types of approximations already at the microscopic level.
Finally, in [20, 21] the problems relating to the continuous-time limit were circumvented
by redefining the equations at the microscopic level directly in terms of full averages
over all possible values of the external information, and the dynamics of the resulting
so-called ‘batch minority game’ was solved exactly using generating functional methods
[19] (first without decision noise [20], then also for general types of decision noise [21]).
In this paper we solve the dynamics of the original (on-line) minority game, along
the lines of [20, 21] (i.e. using generating functional techniques). We show how the
problems and uncertainties relating to temporal regularization, which appear to have
been responsible for generating the debates and approximations surrounding the proper
form of the continuous-time microscopic laws, can be solved and resolved in an elegant
and transparent way by using the (exact) procedure of [18] for deriving a continuous-
time master equation without using the thermodynamic limit. This allows us to write
down the full stochastic microscopic equations (without truncation or approximation)
‡ Using a phenomenological theory for the volatility, based on so-called ‘crowd-anticrowd’ cancellations
[7], this effect was partially explained in [8, 9].
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and solve the model by adapting to the present continuous-time (on-line) process the
generating functional techniques which were employed successfully for the discrete-time
(batch) process in [20, 21]. The end result is an exact dynamical macroscopic theory,
for general types of decision noise (additive, multiplicative, etc), in the form of closed
equations for correlation- and response functions which are defined via an effective single-
trader process, from which the statics follows as a spin-off. Our equations describe both
the ergodic and the non-ergodic regime of the minority game, including transients.
The full exact dynamical solution now available also allows us to make rigorous
retrospective statements about the validity or otherwise of the various approximations
proposed in the past, and to explain under which conditions such approximations could
indeed have led to correct results. More specifically, we (i) show why it is in principle
not allowed to truncate the Kramers-Moyal expansion of the microscopic process after
the Fokker-Planck term (let alone after the flow term), but why upon doing so one can
still find the correct macroscopic equations (for the present version of the MG), (ii)
confirm that the different diffusion matrices for the Fokker-Planck term in the process,
as proposed earlier by others, are incomplete or approximate, and (iii) indicate how
previously proposed approximations involving the market volatility can be traced back
to assumptions relating to ergodicity (and are thus valid at most in the ergodic regime).
2. Definitions
2.1. The Minority Game
The minority game describes the dynamics of decision making by N interacting trading
agents, labeled with Roman indices. At each round ℓ of the game, each agent i has
to take a binary trading decision si(ℓ) ∈ {−1, 1} (e.g. whether to sell or buy). At
each round all agents are given the same external information Iµ(ℓ) (representing e.g.
the overall state of the market, political or economic developments, etc.), which here is
chosen randomly and independently from a total number p = αN of possible values, i.e.
µ(ℓ) ∈ {1, . . . , αN} for each ℓ. To generate trading decisions, each agent i has S fixed
strategies Ria = (R
1
ia, . . . , R
αN
ia ) ∈ {−1, 1}αN at his/her disposal, with a ∈ {1, . . . , S}.
These strategies act as manuals (or look-up tables) for decision making: if strategy a is
being used by agent i at stage ℓ in the game, then the observation of external information
µ(ℓ) will trigger this particular agent into taking the trading decision si(ℓ) = R
µ(ℓ)
ia .
Hence the intrinsic dynamics of the minority game is not driven by the decision variables
si(ℓ), but by the dynamic selection by each trader of trading strategies from his/her
available arsenal, as described below. Each component Rµia is assumed to have been
drawn randomly and independently from {−1, 1} before the start of the game, with
uniform probabilities. The strategies thus introduce quenched disorder into the game.
Given a choice µ(ℓ) made at the start of round ℓ, every agent i selects the
strategy a˜i(ℓ) which for trader i has the highest pay-off value at that point in time,
i.e. a˜i(ℓ) = arg max pia(ℓ), and subsequently makes the binary bid bi(ℓ) = R
µ(ℓ)
ia˜i(ℓ)
. The
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(re-scaled) total bid at stage ℓ is defined as A(ℓ) = N−1/2
∑
i bi(ℓ). Next all agents
update the pay-off values of each of their strategies a on the basis of what would have
happened if they had played that particular strategy:
pia(ℓ+1) = pia(ℓ)− η˜√
N
R
µ(ℓ)
ia A(ℓ) (1)
The constant η˜ represents an (optional) learning rate. Note that the agents all behave as
price takers, i.e. they do not take into account the impact of their own decisions on the
total bid. We here consider only the S = 2 model, where the equations can be simplified
upon introducing qi(ℓ) =
1
2
[pi1(ℓ)−pi2(ℓ)], ωi = 12 [Ri1+Ri2] and ξi = 12 [Ri1−Ri2]. As a
result, the selected strategy in round ℓ can now be written as Ria˜i(ℓ) = ωi+sgn[qi(ℓ)]ξi,
and the evolution of the difference is given by:
qi(ℓ+1) = qi(ℓ)− η˜√
N
ξ
µ(ℓ)
i [Ω
µ(ℓ) +
1√
N
∑
j
ξ
µ(ℓ)
j sgn[qj(ℓ)]] (2)
with Ω = N−1/2
∑
j ωj ∈ ℜαN .
2.2. Minority Game with Decision Noise
The process (2) can and has been generalized in order to include traders’ decision noise
[6, 11]. This can be done in many different ways; here we try to avoid being unnecessarily
specific, and choose a general definition where we replace (as in e.g. [21])
sgn[qj(ℓ)] → σ[qj(ℓ), zj(ℓ)] (3)
in which the zj(ℓ) are independent and zero average random numbers, described by some
symmetric distribution P (z) which is normalised according to
∫
dz P (z) =
∫
dz P (z)z2 =
1. The function σ[q, z] is parametrized by a control parameter T ≥ 0 such that
σ[q, z] ∈ {−1, 1}, with limT→0 σ[q, z] = sgn[q] and limT→∞
∫
dz P (z)σ[q, z] = 0, so that
T can be interpreted as a measure of the degree of stochasticity in the traders’ decision
making. Typical examples are additive and multiplicative noise definitions such as
additive : σ[q, z] = sgn[q + Tz] (4)
multiplicative : σ[q, z] = sgn[q] sgn[1 + Tz] (5)
In the first case (4) the noise has the potential to be overruled by the so-called ‘frozen’
agents, which have qi(t) ∼ q˜it for t→∞ (see [20]). In the second case the decision noise
will even retain its effect for ‘frozen’ agents (if they exist). These definitions represent
situations where for T > 0 a trader need not always use his/her ‘best’ strategy; for
T → 0 we revert back to the process (2). The impact of the multiplicative noise (5) can
be characterised by the monotonic function
λ(T ) =
∫
dz P (z) sgn[1 + Tz] (6)
with λ(0) = 1 and λ(∞) = 0. For e.g. a Gaussian P (z) one has λ(T ) = erf[1/√2T ].
We now find (2) being replaced by
qi(ℓ+1) = qi(ℓ)− η˜√
N
ξ
µ(ℓ)
i A
µ(ℓ)[q(ℓ), z(ℓ)], (7)
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In this expression the quantity Aµ[q, z] denotes the bid which would result upon
presentation of information µ, given the microscopic state q of the system and given
realization z of the decision noise:
Aµ[q, z] = Ωµ +
1√
N
∑
j
ξµj σ[qj , zj ] (8)
3. Microscopic Probabilistic Description
3.1. Temporal Regularization Using the Procedure of Bedeaux et al
We convert the discrete-time on-line stochastic process (1) into an explicit Markovian
description in terms of probability densities. For the present noisy version of the game
one finds a microscopic transition probability density operator W (q|q′) which involves
an average over the random numbers {zi}, indicated by 〈. . .〉z:
pℓ+1(q) =
∫
dq′ W (q|q′)pℓ(q′) (9)
W (q|q′) = 1
p
p∑
µ=1
〈∏
i
δ
[
qi − q′i +
η˜√
N
ξµi A
µ[q′, z]
]〉
z
(10)
In order to carry out systematically the temporal coarse-graining and transform the
dynamics to an appropriately re-scaled continuous time t, we follow the systematic
procedure of [18] and define the duration of each of the iteration steps to be a continuous
random number, the statistics of which are described by the probability πℓ(t) that at
time t precisely ℓ updates have been made. Our new process (including the randomness
in step duration) is described by
pt(q) =
∑
ℓ≥0
πℓ(t)pℓ(q) =
∑
ℓ≥0
πℓ(t)
∫
dq′ W ℓ(q|q′)p0(q′)
and time has become continuous. For πℓ(t) we make the Poisson choice πℓ(t) =
1
ℓ!
(t/∆N )
ℓe−t/∆N . From 〈ℓ〉π = t/∆N and 〈ℓ2〉π = t/∆N + t2/∆2N it follows that ∆N is
the average duration of an iteration step, and that the relative deviation in ℓ at a given
t vanishes for ∆N → 0 as
√
〈ℓ2〉π − 〈ℓ〉2π/〈ℓ〉π =
√
∆N/t. This introduction of random
step durations thus only introduces uncertainty about where we are on the time axis,
which will vanish at the end of the calculation, provided we ensure limN→∞∆N = 0.
The properties of the Poisson distribution under temporal derivation lead to
d
dt
pt(q) =
1
∆N
{∫
dq′ W (q|q′)pt(q′)− pt(q)
}
(11)
3.2. Canonical Temporal Coarse Graining
To find the appropriate scaling with N of ∆N (and investigate the relation with the
Fokker-Planck approximations of [15] and [17] in a subsequent section) it is instructive
to expand the master equation (11) in powers of the learning rate:
d
dt
pt(q) =
1
∆Np
p∑
µ=1
∫
dq′ pt(q
′)〈δ(q− q′ + η˜√
N
ξµAµ[q′, z])− δ(q− q′)〉z
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=
∑
ℓ≥1
[Lℓ pt] (q) (12)
with
[Lℓ p] (q) =
η˜ℓ
N ℓ/2
∑
n1,...,nN≥0
δℓ,
∑
i
ni
n1! . . . nN !
∂ℓ
∂qn11 . . . ∂q
nN
N
×

p(q)

 1
∆Np
p∑
µ=1
(ξµ1 )
n1. . . (ξµN)
nN 〈Aµ[q, z]ℓ〉z



 (13)
From the ℓ = 1 term in this so-called Kramers-Moyal expansion one reads off the
canonical scaling for the temporal coarse-graining time-scale ∆N (in order to guarantee
a proper N →∞ limit):
[L1 p] (q) =
η˜
α∆NN
∑
i
∂
∂qi

p(q)

ξi ·Ω√
N
+
1
N
∑
j
ξi · ξj〈σ[qj , z]〉z




We are automatically led to the choice ∆N = O(η˜/N) (this gives, for T = 0 and for
N → ∞, as our first term exactly the batch dynamics studied in [20]), and we must
require limN→∞ η˜/N = 0 in order to guarantee limN→∞∆N = 0. We now put
∆N = η˜/2αN (14)
(thereby en passant absorbing an additional distracting factor 2α, to find simpler
equations later) and find the various terms (13) in the Kramers-Moyal expansion (12)
reducing to
[Lℓ p] (q) =
2η˜ℓ−1
N
1
2
(ℓ−1)
∑
n1,...,nN≥0
δℓ,
∑
i
ni
n1! . . . nN !
∂ℓ
∂qn11 . . . ∂q
nN
N
p(q)

 1√
N
p∑
µ=1
(ξµ1 )
n1. . . (ξµN)
nN 〈Aµ[q, z]ℓ〉z




(15)
Note that, according to (14), the present canonical definition of the time unit t implies
temporal coarse-graining over O(1/∆N) = O(N/η˜) iteration steps.
3.3. Canonical Scaling of the Learning Rate
The remaining freedom one has is in the choice of the learning rate η˜. In order to
find the appropriate choice(s) for the scaling with N of η˜ we work out the temporal
derivatives of the probability density Pk(q) = 〈δ[q − qk]〉 of individual components of
the microscopic state vector, where 〈f(q)〉 = ∫ dq p(q)f(q) (via integration by parts in
the various terms of (12)):
d
dt
Pk(q) =
∑
ℓ≥1
2η˜ℓ−1
N ℓ/2ℓ!
∂ℓ
∂qℓ
〈
δ[q − qk]
p∑
µ=1
(ξµk )
ℓ〈Aµ[q, z]ℓ〉z
〉
=
∂
∂q
〈
2δ[q − qk]

ξk ·Ω√
N
+
1
N
∑
j
ξk · ξj〈σ[qj , zj]〉z

〉
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+ η˜
∂2
∂q2
〈
δ[q − qk] 1
N
p∑
µ=1
〈[ξµkAµ[q, z]]2〉z
〉
+
∑
ℓ>2
O(N1− 12 ℓη˜ℓ−1) (16)
We see explicitly that the diffusion term in this equation is of order O(η˜). Hence,
in order to prevent the system from being overruled by fluctuations we have to choose
η˜ = O(N0) (with the fluctuations in individual components vanishing altogether as soon
as limN→∞ η˜ = 0). Following [6, 11] and subsequent papers we choose η˜ to be a constant
which is independent of N in the remainder of this study. As a consequence we find
that for N → ∞ the single-trader equation (16) reduces to a Fokker-Planck equation,
in agreement with [15] and [17] (although, as we will show in a subsequent section, the
diffusion matrices proposed in the latter two studies are both approximations). This,
however, does not necessarily imply that the underlying N -agent process can also be
described by a Fokker-Planck equation.
4. Properties of the Kramers-Moyal Expansion
4.1. Relevance of Higher Orders
With the definitions ∆N = η˜/2p and η˜ = O(1) our full microscopic master equation
(11) becomes
d
dt
pt(q) =
2p
η˜
∫
dq′ pt(q
′)

1p
p∑
µ=1
〈
δ
[
q− q′+ η˜√
N
ξµAµ[q′, z]
]〉
z
− δ(q′− q)


(17)
The Kramers-Moyal expansion takes the final form
d
dt
pt(q) =
∑
ℓ≥1
[Lℓ pt] (q) (18)
where
[Lℓp] (q) =
2η˜ℓ−1
N
1
2
ℓ
∑
µ
∑
n1,...,nN≥0
δℓ,
∑
i
ni
n1! . . . nN !
(ξµ1 )
n1. . . (ξµN)
nN
∂ℓ
∂qn11 . . . ∂q
nN
N
×
{
p(q)〈Aµ[q, z]ℓ〉z
}
(19)
or, equivalently,
[Lℓp] (q) =
2η˜ℓ−1
ℓ!
∑
µ
[
1√
N
∑
i
ξµi
∂
∂qi
]ℓ{
p(q)〈Aµ[q, z]ℓ〉z
}
(20)
Although for N → ∞ the individual components of the state vector q were seen to
have Gaussian fluctuations (16), the cumulative effect on the dynamics of the higher
order (ℓ > 2) terms in the expansion (18) (including cross-correlations) cannot simply
be neglected, since also the number of components qi diverges with N . This can be seen
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more clearly in (20) than in (19). If we work out the evolution of averages of observables
f(q), via integration by parts, we find that (18,20) predict
η˜
d
dt
〈f〉 = 2∑
ℓ≥1
(−η˜)ℓ
ℓ!
∑
µ
〈
〈Aµ[q, z]ℓ〉z
[
1√
N
∑
i
ξµi
∂
∂qi
]ℓ
f
〉
For simple mean-field observables such as f(q) = N−1
∑
i ζiq
2m
i (with m independent
of N) one has [ 1√
N
∑
i ξ
µ
i
∂
∂qi
]ℓf = O(N−ℓ/2), and hence the ℓ > 2 terms in the
expansion are of vanishing order. In contrast, for observables which are dominated
by fluctuations, this need no longer be the case. For instance, in the present system
(with its overall reflection symmetry) one has f(q) = 1√
N
∑
i ζiq
2m+1
i = O(N0); now
[ 1√
N
∑
i ξ
µ
i
∂
∂qi
]ℓf = O(N−(ℓ−1)/2), and also the ℓ = 3 term could contribute to leading
order. Moreover, there is no practical need to truncate the expansion, since (as we will
show below) within the generating functional formalism it is perfectly natural to derive
an analytical solution of the dynamics with all terms of the Kramers-Moyal expansion
included.
4.2. Explicit Form of Flow and Diffusion Terms
Let us now, by way of illustration, work out the first few terms of (20) for additive noise
with P (z) = 1
2
K[1− tanh2(Kz)] (as in e.g. [11, 6], with K such that ∫ dz P (z)z2 = 1),
for which 〈σ[q, z]〉z = tanh[βq] (β ≡ K/T ):
[L1 p] (q) =
∑
i
∂
∂qi

2p(q)

ξi ·Ω√
N
+
1
N
∑
j
ξi · ξj tanh[βqj ]



 (21)
[L2 p] (q) = η˜
∑
ij
∂2
∂qi∂qj
{
p(q)
[
1
N
∑
µ
ξµi ξ
µ
j 〈Aµ[q, z]2〉z
]}
(22)
Equation (22) describes, as expected, two types of fluctuations: [L2 p](q) =∑
kℓ ∂
2
kℓ
{
p(q)[MAkℓ +M
B
kℓ]
}
, one describing fluctuations induced by the randomly and
sequentially drawn external information:
MAkℓ =
η˜
N
p∑
µ=1
ξµk ξ
µ
ℓ (Ω
µ +
1√
N
∑
j
ξµj tanh[βqj])
2 (23)
and a second one describing fluctuations induced by the decision noise§:
MBkℓ =
η˜
N2
p∑
µ=1
ξµk ξ
µ
ℓ
∑
i
(ξµi )
2(1− tanh2[βqi]) (24)
The corresponding expressions for multiplicative noise are obtained by simply replacing
tanh[βqk] → λ(T )sgn[qk] in equations (21,23,24). For both noise types the second
contribution (24) to the diffusion matrix vanishes in the limit β → ∞ of deterministic
decision making.
§ Note that limβ→∞MBkℓ = 0, so that the {MAkℓ} represent the fluctuations due to external information
selection in the absence of decision noise. For β < ∞, however, the above causal/interpretational
separation is not perfect, since the two sources of randomness will inevitably be intertwined.
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5. The Generating Functional
5.1. Definition and Discretization
Instead of working with the Kramers-Moyal expansion, it will be more convenient and
safe to return to the underlying master equation (17), which can be written as
d
dt
pt(q) =
2p
η˜
∫
dqˆdq′
(2π)N
ei
∑
i
qˆi(qi−q′i−θi)pt(q
′)
×

1p
p∑
µ=1
〈eiη˜( 1√N
∑
i
qˆiξ
µ
i )A
µ[q′,z]〉z − 1

 (25)
where we have introduced auxiliary driving forces θi(t) in order to identify response
functions later. At this stage we discretise our continuous time, t→ ℓδ (ℓ = 0, 1, 2, . . .)
with intervals 0 < δ ≪ 1 which can be sent to zero independent of the limit N → ∞
(since the procedure of [18], as followed here, leads to a continuous-time master equation
for any N), so that the probability density of finding a path of microscopic states
{q(0),q(δ),q(2δ), . . .} can be written as
Prob[q(0),q(δ),q(2δ), . . .] = p0(q(0))
∏
t>0
W˜t[q(t)|q(t− δ)] (26)
with
W˜t[q|q′] =
∫
dqˆ
(2π)N
ei
∑
i
qˆi(qi−q′i−θi(t))
×
{
2δ
η˜
∑
µ
〈eiη˜[ 1√N
∑
i
qˆiξ
µ
i ]A
µ[q′,z]〉z + (1− 2pδ
η˜
)
}
(27)
The moment generating functional for our stochastic process is defined as
Z[ψ] = 〈 ei
∑
t
∑
i
ψi(t)qi(t) 〉
=
∫ ∏
t
{
dq(t) W˜t[q(t+ δ)|q(t)]
}
p0(q(0)) e
i
∑
t
∑
i
ψi(t)qi(t)
where, as in [20], we introduced external forces θi(t) to generate response functions
later. Derivation of the generating functional with respect to the conjugate variables ψ
generates all moments of q at arbitrary times. Upon introducing the two short-hands:
wµt =
√
2√
N
∑
i
qˆi(t)ξ
µ
i , x
µ
t =
√
2√
N
∑
i
si(t)ξ
µ
i ,
with si(t) ≡ σ[qi(t), zi(t)], as well as Dq = ∏it[dqi(t)/√2π], Dw = ∏µt[dwµt /√2π] and
Dx = ∏µt[dxµt /√2π] (with similar definitions for Dqˆ, Dwˆ and Dxˆ, respectively), the
generating functional takes the following form:
Z[ψ] =
∫
DwDwˆDxDxˆ ei
∑
tµ
[wˆµt w
µ
t +xˆ
µ
t x
µ
t ]
∏
t
{
1+
2δ
η˜
∑
µ
[
e
iη˜w
µ
t√
2
[Ωµ+
x
µ
t√
2
]−1
]}
×
∫
DqDqˆ p0(q(0)) 〈e−
i
√
2√
N
∑
µi
ξµi
∑
t
[wˆµt qˆi(t)+xˆ
µ
t si(t)]〉z
× ei
∑
ti
[qˆi(t)(qi(t+δ)−qi(t)−θi(t))+ψi(t)qi(t)] (28)
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We note that, as δ → 0 (and using δ∑t = O(δ0)):
∏
t
{
1+
2δ
η˜
∑
µ
[
e
iη˜w
µ
t√
2
[Ωµ+
x
µ
t√
2
]−1
]}
= e
∑
µ
∑
t
2δ
η˜
[
e
iη˜w
µ
t√
2
[Ωµ+
x
µ
t√
2
]−1+O(δN)
]
Hence, if we choose δ ≪ N−1 we obtain
Z[ψ] =
∫
DwDwˆDxDxˆ e
∑
tµ
[
iwˆµt w
µ
t +ixˆ
µ
t x
µ
t +
2δ
η˜
[e
iη˜w
µ
t
[Ωµ+
x
µ
t√
2
]/
√
2−1+o(N0)]
]
×
∫
DqDqˆ p0(q(0)) 〈e−
i
√
2√
N
∑
µi
ξµi
∑
t
[wˆµt qˆi(t)+xˆ
µ
t si(t)]〉z
× ei
∑
ti
[qˆi(t)(qi(t+δ)−qi(t)−θi(t))+ψi(t)qi(t)] (29)
5.2. Disorder Average
At this stage we carry out the disorder averages, denoted as [· · ·]dis, which involve the
variables ξµi =
1
2
(Rµi1 − Rµi2) and Ωµ = 12N−
1
2
∑
j(R
µ
j1 + R
µ
j2). For times which do not
scale with N and for simple initial conditions of the form p0(q) =
∏
i p0(qi) one finds:
[Z[ψ]]dis =
∫
DwDwˆDxDxˆ ei
∑
tµ
[wˆµt w
µ
t +xˆ
µ
t x
µ
t ]
×
∫
DqDqˆ ∏
i
p0(qi(0)) e
i
∑
ti
[qˆi(t)(qi(t+δ)−qi(t)−θi(t))+ψi(t)qi(t)] (30)
×


〈∏
µ
e
2δ
η˜
∑
t
[
e
iη˜w
µ
t
[Ωµ+
x
µ
t√
2
]/
√
2−1+o(N0)
]
− i
√
2√
N
∑
i
ξi
∑
t
[wˆµt qˆi(t)+xˆ
µ
t si(t)]
〉
z


dis
We concentrate on the term in (30) with the disorder averages. These are similar to
but generally more difficult than those calculated in [20] (to which they reduce only
for η˜ → 0). As in [20] they automatically generate the dynamic order parameters
Ctt′ = N
−1∑
i si(t)si(t
′), Ktt′ = N−1
∑
i si(t)qˆi(t
′), and Ltt′ = N−1
∑
i qˆi(t)qˆi(t
′) and
their conjugates:
∏
µ
[. . .]dis =
∏
µ


∫
dΩdΩˆ
2π
ei
ˆΩΩ+ 2δ
η˜
∑
t
[e
iη˜w
µ
t
[Ω+
x
µ
t√
2
]/
√
2−1+o(N0)]
×∏
i

e− iR
µ
i1√
2N
[
ˆΩ/
√
2+
∑
t
[wˆµt qˆi(t)+xˆ
µ
t si(t)]
]
− iR
µ
i2√
2N
[
ˆΩ/
√
2−
∑
t
[wˆµt qˆi(t)+xˆ
µ
t si(t)]
]

dis


=
∏
µ


∫
dΩdΩˆ
2π
ei
ˆΩΩ+ 2δ
η˜
∑
t
[e
iη˜w
µ
t
[Ω+
x
µ
t√
2
]/
√
2−1]+o(N0)
× e
− 1
4N
∑
i
[
(
ˆΩ√
2
+
∑
t
[wˆµt qˆi(t)+xˆ
µ
t si(t)])
2+(
ˆΩ√
2
−
∑
t
[wˆµt qˆi(t)+xˆ
µ
t si(t)])
2
]

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=
∏
µ


∫
dΩdΩˆ
2π
ei
ˆΩΩ− 1
4
ˆΩ
2
+ 2δ
η˜
∑
t
[e
iη˜w
µ
t
[Ω+
x
µ
t√
2
]/
√
2−1]+o(N0)
× e− 12N
∑
i[
∑
t
[wˆµt qˆi(t)+xˆ
µ
t si(t)]]
2
}
=
∏
µ


∫
dΩ√
π
e−Ω
2+ 2δ
η˜
∑
t
[e
iη˜w
µ
t
[Ω+
x
µ
t√
2
]/
√
2−1]+o(N0)
× e− 12
∑
tt′[wˆ
µ
t Ltt′ wˆ
µ
t′+2xˆ
µ
tKtt′ wˆ
µ
t′+xˆ
µ
t Ctt′ xˆ
µ
t′]
}
(31)
Insertion into (30), followed by the isolation of the order parameters via δ-distributions
(whose integral representations generate the conjugate order parameters) then gives
Z[ψ] =
∫
[DCDCˆ][DKDKˆ][DLDLˆ] eN[Ψ+Φ+Ω+o(N0)] (32)
The o(N0) term in the exponent is independent of the fields {ψi(t)} and {θi(t)}. Upon
choosing an appropriate scaling with δ of the conjugate integration variables (viz.
(xˆ, wˆ) → δ(xˆ, wˆ) and (Cˆ, Kˆ, Lˆ) → δ2(Cˆ, Kˆ, Lˆ), to guarantee the existence of a proper
δ → 0 limit of the various time summations), the three relevant exponents in (32) are
given by the following expressions:
Ψ = iδ2
∑
tt′
[Cˆtt′Ctt′ + Kˆtt′Ktt′ + Lˆtt′Ltt′ ], (33)
Φ = α log
[∫
DwDwˆDxDxˆ e− 12 δ2
∑
tt′ [wˆtLtt′ wˆt′+2xˆtKtt′ wˆt′+xˆtCtt′ xˆt′ ]
× eiδ
∑
t
[wˆtwt+xˆtxt]
∫
Du e
2δ
η˜
∑
t
[e
1
2
iη˜wt [u+xt]−1]
]
(34)
Ω =
1
N
∑
i
log〈
∫
DqDqˆ p0(q(0)) eiδ
∑
t[qˆ(t)(
q(t+δ)−q(t)
δ
−δ−1θi(t))+δ−1ψi(t)q(t)]
× e−iδ2
∑
tt′ [Cˆtt′s(t)s(t
′)+Kˆtt′s(t)qˆ(t
′)+Lˆtt′ qˆ(t)qˆ(t
′)]〉z (35)
with the standard abbreviation of the Gaussian measure Du = (2π)−
1
2 e−
1
2
u2du.
The average 〈. . .〉z has now been reduced to a single site one: 〈g[z1, z2, . . .]〉z =∫∏
t[dztP (zt)] g[z1, z2, . . .]. Following [20] we have also introduced the short-hands
Dq = ∏t[dq(t)/√2π], Dw = ∏t[dwt/√2π], Dx = ∏t[dxt/√2π] (with similar definitions
for Dqˆ, Dwˆ and Dxˆ).
6. The Saddle-Point Equations
6.1. Derivation of Saddle-Point Equations
We can now evaluate (32) by saddle-point integration, in the limitN →∞, and provided
the order parameter functions depend asymptotically on their two time arguments in
a sufficiently smooth (i.e. N -independent) way. We define Gtt′ = −iKtt′ . Taking
derivatives with respect to the generating fields and using the normalisation Z[0] = 1
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then gives (at the physical saddle-point) the usual relations
Ctt′ = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
〈si(t)si(t′)〉 (36)
Gtt′ = lim
N→∞
1
N
∑
i
∂
∂θi(t′)
〈si(t)〉 (37)
Ltt′ = 0 (38)
Putting ψi(t) = 0 (they are no longer needed) and θi(t) = δ.θ˜(t) then simplifies (35) to
Ω = log
∫
DqDqˆ p0(q(0)) e−iδ2
∑
tt′ qˆ(t)Lˆtt′ qˆ(t
′)
× 〈eiδ
∑
t
qˆ(t)[
q(t+δ)−q(t)
δ
−θ˜(t)−δ
∑
t′ Kˆt′ts(t
′)]−iδ2
∑
tt′ s(t)Cˆtt′ s(t
′)〉z (39)
in which now s(t) = σ[q(t), zt]. Extremisation of the extensive exponent Ψ + Φ + Ω of
(32) with respect to {C, Cˆ,K, Kˆ, L, Lˆ} gives the remaining saddle-point equations
Ctt′ = 〈s(t)s(t′)〉⋆ Gtt′ = ∂〈s(t)〉⋆
δ∂θ˜(t′)
(40)
Cˆtt′ =
i
δ2
∂Φ
∂Ctt′
Kˆtt′ =
i
δ2
∂Φ
∂Ktt′
Lˆtt′ =
i
δ2
∂Φ
∂Ltt′
(41)
The effective single-trader averages 〈. . .〉⋆, generated by taking derivatives of (35), are
defined as
〈f [{q, s}]〉⋆ =
∫Dq 〈M [{q, s}]f [{q, s}]〉z∫Dq 〈M [{q, s}]〉z (42)
M [{q, s}] = p0(q(0)) e−iδ2
∑
tt′ s(t)Cˆtt′s(t
′)
∫
Dqˆ e−iδ2
∑
tt′ qˆ(t)Lˆtt′ qˆ(t
′)
× eiδ
∑
t
qˆ(t)[
q(t+δ)−q(t)
δ
−θ˜(t)−δ
∑
t′ Kˆt′ts(t
′)] (43)
Upon elimination of the trio {Cˆ, Kˆ, Lˆ} via (41) we obtain exact closed equations for the
disorder-averaged correlation- and response functions in the N → ∞ limit: equations
(40), with the effective single trader measure (43).
6.2. Simplification of Saddle-Point Equations
The introduction of on-line evolution and decision noise into the dynamics has affected
the terms Φ (34) and Ω (39), compared to the analysis in [20]. In order to proceed we
now have to work out the term Φ (34) further:
Φ = α log
∫
DuDwDx φ[{x, w}, u]
×
∫
DwˆDxˆ e− 12 δ2
∑
tt′ [wˆtLtt′ wˆt′+2xˆtKtt′wˆt′+xˆtCtt′ xˆt′ ]+iδ
∑
t
[wˆtwt+xˆtxt] (44)
where
φ[{x, w}, u] = exp
[
2δ
η˜
∑
t
[e
1
2
iη˜wt[u+xt] − 1]
]
(45)
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Upon expanding the ‘inner’ exponential in this expression in a power series, we can
write φ as an average of the form:
φ[{x, w}, u] =
〈
exp
[
1
2
iη˜
∑
t
ntwt[u+ xt]
]〉
n
(46)
where 〈·〉n is defined as:
〈f [n1, n2, . . .]〉n ≡
∑
n1,n2...≥0
[∏
s
P2δ/η˜[ns] f [n1, n2, . . .]
]
(47)
with the Poisson distribution Pa[ℓ] =
1
ℓ!
e−aaℓ. The first two moments of the distribution
are given by 〈nt〉n = 2δ/η˜ and 〈n2t 〉n = (2δ/η˜)2 + 2δ/η˜. We now insert (46) into (44),
followed by integration over u, {x}, {xˆ} and {w} (in precisely that order). This gives,
with K = iG, with the diagonal matrix Ett′ =
1
2
η˜ntδtt′ , and with the matrix D whose
entries are defined as Dtt′ = 1 + Ctt′ :
Φ = α log
〈
Det−
1
2 [EDE]
×
∫
Dwˆ e− 12 δ2
∑
tt′ wˆt[L+(1I+G
†E)(EDE)−1(1I+EG)]
tt′ wˆt′
〉
n
(48)
(modulo an irrelevant constant). Taking the derivative of Φ with respect to the matrix
elements {Ltt′ , Ctt′ , Gtt′}, followed by setting L→ 0, gives (using the causality property
Gtt′ = 0 for t ≤ t′, which guarantees that Det(1I + EG) = 1):
lim
L→0
∂Φ
∂Ltt′
= − 1
2
α
〈[
(1I+EG)−1EDE(1I+G†E)−1
]
tt′
〉
n
(49)
lim
L→0
∂Φ
∂Ctt′
= 0 (50)
lim
L→0
∂Φ
∂Gtt′
= − α
〈[
(1I+EG)−1E
]
t′t
〉
n
(51)
According to (41) this gives for the conjugate order parameters:
Lˆtt′ = − 1
2
iαΣtt′ (52)
Cˆtt′ = 0 (53)
Kˆtt′ = − αRt′t (54)
with
Σ =
1
δ2
〈
(1I+EG)−1EDE(1I+G†E)−1
〉
n
(55)
R =
1
δ2
〈
(1I+EG)−1E
〉
n
(56)
6.3. Evaluation of Poisson Averages
Finally, it turns out that in these latter two matrices (55,56) the averages over the {nt}
can be performed exactly, by using causality. We first deal with (56) (which is simpler):
Rtt′ =
1
δ2
∑
ℓ≥0
(−1)ℓ〈[(EG)ℓE]tt′〉n
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We note that each of the terms in the expansion gives factorised averages due to Gss′ = 0
for s ≤ s′ (using only that 〈ns〉n = 2δ/η˜ for any s):
〈[(EG)ℓE]tt′〉n = (1
2
η˜)ℓ+1
∑
s1,...,sℓ−1
〈ntGts1ns1Gs1s2ns2Gs2s3 . . . nsℓ−1Gsℓ−1t′nt′〉n
= (
1
2
η˜)ℓ+1
∑
t>s1>...>sℓ−1>t′
Gts1Gs1s2 . . . Gsℓ−1t′〈ntns1 . . . nsℓ−1nt′〉n
= δℓ+1Gℓtt′
giving the simple result
R =
1
δ
[1I + δG]−1 (57)
We note that in calculating (57) knowledge of only the first moment of the {nt}
distribution was required.
Next we turn to the noise covariance matrix:
Σtt′ =
1
δ2
∑
ℓℓ′≥0
(−1)ℓ+ℓ′〈[(EG)ℓEDE(G†E)ℓ′]tt′〉n (58)
Now, again due to causality, only averages of terms with at most two n-variables with
the same time index can occur. We have to take into account the extra contributions
coming from all possible time pairings. Using 〈n2s〉 = 〈ns〉2[1 + η˜/2δ] we derive:
〈[(EG)ℓEDE(G†E)ℓ′]s0s′0〉n =
∑
sℓs
′
ℓ
Dsℓs′ℓ〈[(EG)ℓE]s0sℓ [(EG)ℓ
′
E]s′0s′ℓ〉n
= (
1
2
η˜)ℓ+ℓ
′+2
∑
s0>...>sℓ
∑
s′0>...>s
′
ℓ
Dsℓs′ℓ Gs0s1 . . . Gsℓ−1sℓ Gs′0s′1 . . . Gs′ℓ′−1s
′
ℓ
× 〈ns0 . . . nsℓns′0 . . . ns′ℓ〉n
= δℓ+ℓ
′+2
∑
s0>...>sℓ
∑
s′0>...>s
′
ℓ
Dsℓs′ℓ
[
1 +
η˜
2δ
]∑ℓ
i=0
∑ℓ′
j=0
δsis′j
× Gs0s1 . . . Gsℓ−1sℓ Gs′0s′1 . . . Gs′ℓ′−1s′ℓ
= δℓ+ℓ
′+2 ∑
s0>...>sℓ
∑
s′0>...>s
′
ℓ
Dsℓs′ℓ
ℓ∏
i=0
ℓ′∏
j=0
[
1 + δsis′j
η˜
2δ
]
× Gs0s1 . . . Gsℓ−1sℓ Gs′0s′1 . . . Gs′ℓ′−1s′ℓ (59)
where the factor
∑ℓ
i=0
∑ℓ′
j=0 δsis′j counts the number of pairings occurring in the two
types of time arguments (i.e. those with primes, and those without). We note that to
find expression (59) knowledge of only the first two moments of the {nt}-distribution
was required.
7. The Effective Single-Agent Process
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7.1. Discretized Single-Agent Process
Upon inserting the results (52,53,54) we now find our effective single trader measure
M [{q, s}] of (43) reducing further to the following expression (modulo a constant pre-
factor reflecting normalisation, which is independent of the decision noise variables
{z(t)}):
M [{q, s}] = p0(q(0))
∫
Dη e− 12
∑
tt′ η(t)Σ
−1
tt′ η(t
′)
× δ
[
q(t+ δ)− q(t)
δ
− θ˜(t) + αδ∑
t′
Rtt′s(t
′)−√αη(t)
]
(60)
with Rtt′ = δ
−1[1I + δG]−1tt′ (57). This describes a single-agent process of the form
q(t+ δ)− q(t)
δ
= θ˜(t)− αδ∑
t′
Rtt′σ[q(t
′), z(t′)] +
√
αη(t) (61)
Causality ensures that Rtt′ = 0 for t
′ > t. The variable zt represents the original
single-trader decision noise, with 〈z(t)〉z = 0 and 〈z(t)z(t′)〉z = δtt′ , and η(t) is a
disorder-generated Gaussian noise with zero mean and with temporal correlations given
by (58,59).
7.2. Continuous Time Limit
We can now take the limit δ → 0 and restore continuous time. The bookkeeping of δ-
terms is found to come out right, with partial derivatives with respect to the perturbation
fields converting into functional derivatives, with time summations converting into
integrals, and with matrices converting into integral operators (with the usual convention
1
δ
1Itt′ → δ[t−t′]). Upon making the ansatz that our order parameters are smooth
functions of time, we then lose the remaining microscopic variables {z(t)} in the
retarded self-interaction term (which are automatically converted into averages over
their distribution) and end up with the effective single trader problem
d
dt
q(t) = θ˜(t)− α
∫ t
0
dt′ R(t, t′)〈σ[q(t′), z]〉z +
√
αη(t) (62)
The correlation- and response functions (36,37) are the dynamic order parameters of the
problem, and must now be solved self-consistently from the following closed equations
C(t, t′) = 〈 〈σ[q(t), z]〉z 〈σ[q(t′), z]〉z 〉⋆ (63)
G(t, t′) =
δ
δθ˜(t′)
〈 〈σ[q(t), z]〉z 〉⋆ (64)
(for t 6= t′). The brackets 〈. . .〉⋆ now refer to the stochastic process (62) (which
no longer involves the {z(t)}, only their distribution). Note that the correlation-
and response functions are generally discontinuous at t = t′, viz. C(t, t) = 1 and
G(t, t) = 0 (in our derivation we have used the Itoˆ convention). For additive noise with
P (z) = 1
2
K[1 − tanh2(Kz)] (as in e.g. [11, 6], with K such that ∫ dz P (z)z2 = 1), for
instance, one has 〈σ[q, z]〉z = tanh[βq] with inverse ‘temperature’ β ≡ K/T . While for
multiplicative noise one finds: 〈σ[q, z]〉z = λ(T )sgn(q) with λ(T ) =
∫
dz P (z)sgn[1+Tz].
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What remains is to take the continuous time limit in our expressions for the effective
noise covariance and the retarded self-interaction kernel. The latter, defined by (57),
simply becomes
R(t, t′) = lim
δ→0
1
δ
[1I + δG]−1tt′
= δ(t− t′) +∑
ℓ>0
(−1)ℓGℓ(t, t′) (65)
with the usual definition for multiplication of the continuous time kernels Gℓ+1(t, t′) =∫
dt′′ Gℓ(t, t′′)G(t′′, t′). The continuous time limit of the noise covariance kernel (58)
becomes
Σ(s0, s
′
0) =
∑
ℓℓ′≥0
(−1)ℓ+ℓ′ lim
δ→0
δℓ+ℓ
′ ∑
s0>...>sℓ≥0
∑
s′0>...>s
′
ℓ
≥0
ℓ∏
i=0
ℓ′∏
j=0
[
1 + δsis′j
η˜
2δ
]
× [1+C(sℓ, s′ℓ)]G(s0, s1) . . . G(sℓ−1, sℓ)G(s′0, s′1) . . .G(s′ℓ′−1, s′ℓ)
=
∑
ℓℓ′≥0
(−1)ℓ+ℓ′
∫ ∞
0
ds1 . . . dsℓds
′
1 . . . ds
′
ℓ
ℓ∏
i=0
ℓ′∏
j=0
[
1 +
1
2
η˜δ(si − s′j)
]
× [1+C(sℓ, s′ℓ)]G(s0, s1) . . . G(sℓ−1, sℓ)G(s′0, s′1) . . .G(s′ℓ′−1, s′ℓ)
(66)
8. Stationary State in the Ergodic Regime
In this section we study the long time limit of the effective single agent process (62) in
the regime where the following three conditions are met: time translation invariance,
i.e.
lim
t→∞C(t+ τ, t) = C(τ), limt→∞G(t+ τ, t) = G(τ), (67)
a finite integrated response (or static susceptibility), i.e.
lim
t→∞
∫
dt′G(t, t′) = χ <∞ (68)
and weak long-term memory [22], i.e.
lim
t→∞
∫ tw
0
dt′G(t, t′) = 0 for any fixed tw (69)
Together these three conditions ensure that also the retarded self-interaction R and the
noise covariance matrix Σ will become time translation invariant: limt→∞R(t + τ, t) =
R(τ) and limt→∞Σ(t + τ, t) = Σ(τ). We introduce the following notation for long time
averages: f = limτ→∞ τ−1
∫ τ
0 dt f(t). Upon assuming the above three conditions to hold,
we can calculate the long time average for the single agent process (62), giving:
dq/dt = θ − α
1 + χ
〈σ〉z +
√
α η. (70)
It has been noted and exploited earlier (in e.g. [10] and [20]) that agents can be divided
into two categories: frozen agents who get completely fixed on one specific strategy, and
fickle agents who always continue to alternate their strategies. The first type of agent
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will have a non-zero average preference velocity, dq/dt 6= 0, while for the agents in the
latter group one has dq/dt = 0. For fickle agents it follows from equation (70) that
〈σ〉z = (1 + χ)(θ +
√
αη)/α. This implies that a necessary condition for an agent to be
fickle is:
fickle agents : |θ +√αη| ≤ α
1 + χ
|〈σ[±∞, z]〉z| ≡ γ. (71)
Note that |〈σ[±∞, z]〉z| = λ(T ) for multiplicative noise, and that |〈σ[±∞, z]〉z| = 1 for
additive noise. With the conventions λ = λ(T ) for multiplicative noise and λ = 1 for
additive noise, we cover both cases by writing γ = λα/(1+χ). If an agent is frozen, the
preference velocity dq/dt must have the same sign as q(t), and thus also the same sign
as 〈σ〉z. This implies
frozen agents : |θ +√αη| ≥ α
1 + χ
|〈σ〉z| = γ (72)
Since the two conditions (71,72) are complementary, they are are not only necessary
but also sufficient for characterizing agents as either fickle (71) or frozen (72). The
asymptotic behaviour of the agent is thus completely determined by the persistent noise
η, which is a Gaussian random variable with zero mean and a variance given by
〈η2〉⋆ = lim
t→∞
1
t
∫ t
0
dt′Σ(t′) =
1 + c
(1 + χ)2
, (73)
in which we find the persistent auto-correlation c = limτ→∞ τ−1
∫ τ
0 dtC(t). The latter
observable can be expressed in terms of the integrated response χ, the market’s control
parameter α, and the fraction of frozen agents φ. To do this we first separate the
expression for c into frozen and fickle contributions, by using the conditions (71,72) (we
may set θ = 0):
c =
〈
〈σ〉z2Θ(|
√
αη| − γ)
〉
⋆
+
〈
〈σ〉z2Θ(γ − |
√
αη|)
〉
⋆
= λ2
〈
Θ(|√αη| − γ)
〉
⋆
+
(
1 + χ√
α
)2 〈
η2Θ(γ − |√αη|)
〉
⋆
, (74)
where Θ denotes the step-function. Only Gaussian integrals remain (defining the
distribution of η). To compactify the final result it is convenient to introduce
y =
λ
√
α√
2(1 + c)
. (75)
The fraction of frozen agents φ and the persistent correlation c can now be written as
φ = 1− erf(y) (76)
c = λ2
(
φ(y) +
2
y2
∫ y
0
dx√
π
x2e−x
2
)
. (77)
Under the conditions (67,68,69) we can calculate the static susceptibility without
knowing the non-persistent parts of the response- and correlation functions. The reason
for this is that, asymptotically, the frozen agents will not change their preferences when
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subjected to an infinitesimal external perturbation field, whereas the fickle agents will
react linearly to such a field. In formulae:
χ = lim
t→∞
∫ t
0
dt′
δ
δθ˜(t′)
〈〈σ[q(t), z]〉z〉⋆ =
∂
∂θ
〈
〈σ〉z
〉
⋆
=
1
α
(1− φ)(1 + χ).
Or, equivalently:
χ =
1− φ
α− (1− φ) . (78)
The equations (75), (77) and (78) completely specify the stationary behaviour of the
system. They are exact for the on-line minority game. We will not give a detailed
exposition of the behaviour of the solutions of the equations here, because they have
been presented and discussed at length in earlier papers. The interested reader is referred
to [12] and [20] in particular.
However, it is appropriate at this point to discuss the status of our assumptions
(67,68,69). Equation (78) tells us that χ is positive and finite for α > 1 − φ, and will
diverge at α = 1 − φ. Numerical solution of (75,77,78) shows that this happens at
α = αc(T ), where αc(0) ≈ 0.3374, and αc(T ) tends to 0 as T → ∞ (see [21] for the
phase diagram in the (α, T ) plane). For α > αc(T ) simulations and theory are found
to be in perfect agreement, and there is no evidence that the assumptions (67,68,69) do
not hold. Below αc(T ), however, the system’s behaviour is known to depend strongly
on initial conditions [15, 20, 17]. This indicates that most likely not only condition
(68) (finite integrated response) ceases to hold, but also (69) (weak long-term memory).
These two conditions may seem very similar; however, work in progress on a version of
the MG where agents try to correct for their own impact on the market [23] indicates
that it is possible to have a long-term memory and a finite integrated response [24]. For
the original minority game as presented here we have found no evidence that this can
happen. Hence, equations (77) and (78) can for α > αc(T ) be regarded as an exact and
complete description of the persistent order parameters of the minority game.
9. The Volatility
9.1. Definitions and Exact Relations
An important measure of the efficiency of a market is the average mismatch of buyers
and sellers. In the case of the minority game this is given by the magnitude of the total
bid A(ℓ). Since in the present model the long term average A = limL→∞ 1L
∑
ℓ≤LA(ℓ)
vanishes, the appropriate measure here is the volatility σ, which measures the size of
the fluctuations of A (see equation (8)) in the stationary state:
σ2 = lim
L→∞
1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
A(ℓ)2 = lim
L→∞
1
L
L∑
ℓ=1
{Aµ(ℓ)[q(ℓ), z(ℓ)]}2. (79)
If the limit L→∞ is taken before the thermodynamic limit N →∞, then the volatility
will be self-averaging with respect to the realization of the presentation of the patterns
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{µ(ℓ)}, with respect to the realization of the decision noise {z(ℓ)}, and with respect to
the realization of the quenched disorder variablesΩ and ξ. Hence, in the thermodynamic
limit, the average volatility (over the above sources of randomness) will be identical to
the single sample volatility. In the continuous-time version of the process, i.e. after the
introduction of Poisson-distributed iteration durations, one may write:
σ2 = lim
τ→∞
1
τ
∫ τ
0
dt
[
1
p
∑
µ
〈
〈Aµ[q(t), z(t)]2〉z
〉]
dis
, (80)
Here the average without subscripts refers to the full stochastic process (including both
the randomness in the selection of the external information as well as that induced by
the decision noise). The approach followed in the present paper in fact allows us to
study a more general object than the volatility:
Ξ(t, t′) =
1
p
∑
µ
[〈〈Aµ[q(t), z(t)]Aµ[q(t′), z(t′)]〉z〉]dis , (81)
From (81) the volatility follows as
σ2 = lim
τ→∞
1
τ
∫ τ
0
dt Ξ(t, t) (82)
In contrast to (80), the quantity (81) also describes transient bid fluctuations and
their correlations. The quantity (81) is calculated via a simple adaptation of the
corresponding calculation in [20] (to which we refer for full details). One introduces the
observables Aµt = Ω
µ+xµt /
√
2 explicitly into the calculation of the generating functional
using a delta function (written in integral form, which generates the conjugate variables
Aˆµt ), similar to the introduction of x
µ
t and w
µ
t . After having done the integral over Ω
µ
one then finds Aµt = (u + xt)/
√
2. If we apply this modification to equations (44,46),
and perform the Gaussian integrals over u, x, xˆ, w, wˆ and Aˆ (in this order) we are left
with (modulo an irrelevant constant):
Φ =
1
N
∑
µ
log
〈∫
DAµ exp
[
−∑
tt′
Aµt
[
(1I +GE)†D−1(1I +GE)
]
tt′
Aµt′
]〉
n
From this it follows that the covariance matrix (80) is half the inverse of the matrix
appearing in the above exponential between Aµt and A
µ
t′ .
Ξtt′ =
1
2
〈[
(1I +GE)−1D(1I + EG†)−1
]
tt′
〉
n
(83)
In this expression one can carry out explicitly the average over the variables {nt},
similar to the calculation of the noise covariance matrix (66) (to which (81) is found to
be similar but, in contrast to the batch cases studied in [20, 21], not proportional). Upon
subsequently taking the continuous time limit δ → 0 this leads to an exact expression
for the generalized volatility matrix (81), at any combination of times (t, t′), in terms of
our dynamical order parameters C(t, t′) and G(t, t′).
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9.2. Expression for the Volatility in Terms of Persistent Order Parameters
Since in practice it is very difficult to solve the order parameter equations (63,64) for
finite temporal separations, it would be helpful to find an expression for (83) (and hence
also the volatility) which involves persistent order parameters only. In the remainder
of this section we discuss procedures to achieve this in the ergodic regime α > αc(T ).
First we turn to the long time correlation in bids. If t and t′ are sufficiently separated
and conditions (67,68,69) hold (so that G decays effectively on finite time-scales), the
Poisson average in (83) factorizes over the two E matrices, so that in the continuous-time
limit the long term bid correlations reduce to
Ξ(∞) = lim
τ→∞ limt→∞Ξ(t+ τ, t)
= lim
δ→0
lim
τ→∞ limt→∞
1
2
[
(1I + δG)−1D(1I + δG†)−1
]
t+τ,t
=
1
2
1 + c
(1 + χ)2
(84)
This result is exact. For the volatility itself, which in view of (67,68,69) can be written
as σ2 = limt→∞ Ξ(t, t), and which depends on the detailed short-time structure of the
kernels G and D, one has to resort to approximations. One such approximation is
motivated by a property of mean-field disordered systems with detailed balance, where
fluctuation-dissipation theorems (FDT) allow one to gauge away the non-persistent parts
of the response and correlation function while leaving averages containing a single time
index and averages containing infinitely separated times unchanged (see e.g. [26]);
for equilibrium systems the resulting simpler equations are exact. Although no general
analogons of equilibrium FDT’s are as yet known for non-equilibrium systems such as the
minority game, one could assume that the resulting recipe for removing non-persistent
contributions to the various kernels also applies to non-equilibrium systems; this as yet
ad-hoc assumption has recently been applied with remarkable success to a similar non-
equilibrium problem [25]. Here it would amount to removing all non-persistent parts
of the various kernels, while retaining the relations δ
∑
tGtt′ = χ,
1
τ
∑
t≤τ Ct,t′ = c and
Ctt = 1, i.e. one inserts
Ct,t′ = c+ (1− c)δtt′ , Gt,t′ = χγ(1− γδ)t−t′−1 (t > t′), (85)
and takes γ → 0 at the end of the calculation. The only expressions containing G which
will survive this limit, are those were each instance of G is summed over the whole
history. More specifically, in the volatility
σ2 =
1
2
∑
ℓ≥0
∑
ℓ′≥0
〈[
(GE)ℓD(EG†)ℓ
′]
(0)
〉
n
(86)
contractions like δ
∑
sGtsGt′s cannot survive, as they are of order γ. Hence the Poisson
average in (86) factorizes over the E matrices, and the only non-vanishing term involving
the diagonal part of D is the term ℓ = ℓ′ = 0 term. The result‖ is
σ2 ≈ 1
2
1 + c
(1 + χ)2
+
1
2
(1− c). (87)
‖ Note: in the batch case [20, 21] one finds a slightly different expression.
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This expression for the volatility depends only on persistent order parameters, and is
independent of the learning rate η˜. Work is in progress to explore and understand the
theoretical basis, if it exists, of (or disprove the correctness of, as the case may be) the
elimination of the non-persistent parts in general mean-field disordered systems without
detailed balance, which underlies the derivation of (87) from the exact expression (86)
in the ergodic regime.
10. Relation Between Present Exact Solution and Previous Work
The present study improves upon and generalizes previous work on the on-line MG in
several ways: it is exact for N →∞, it is a dynamical theory (with statics included as a
spin-off), and it deals with a large family of decision noise definitions (including additive
and multiplicative noise, and intermediates). In this section we compare the various
approximations and assumptions made in previous studies with the exact solution, and
also compare the solution of the on-line MG with that of the batch MG.
10.1. Expressions for the Diffusion Matrix
The first study in which one finds an expression for the diffusion matrix of the
microscopic on-line process is [15] (concerned with both additive and multiplicative
noise). Comparison with the exact expressions (23,24) shows that the matrix given in
[15] can be regarded as an approximation obtained by disregarding fluctuations due to
the selection of external information, and retaining only those generated by the decision
noise. Note that, similar to (24), it contains the factors (1− tanh2[βqi]) and vanishes as
β →∞. The diffusion term presented more recently (for additive noise) in [17] can also
be seen as an approximation of (23,24), obtained upon replacing
∑
µ ξ
µ
k ξ
µ
ℓ 〈Aµ[q, z]2〉z by
limτ→∞ τ−1
∑
t≤τ
∑
µ ξ
µ
k ξ
µ
ℓ
1
p
∑
ν〈Aν [q(t), z]2〉z, i.e. by neglecting certain correlations and
subsequently introducing an additional temporal average over q.
Note that neither of the two studies [15, 17] attempt to solve the dynamics; the
objective of [15] was to highlight the presence and role of the diffusion term in the
microscopic equations (since at the time the microscopic laws were claimed to be
effectively deterministic [11]). The authors of [17] have to restrict themselves to statics,
since in their approximation and subsequent analysis they neglect the time dependence
of the fluctuation term which they replace by the volatility (or, equivalently, they do not
regard their volatility as time-dependent). However, their approach does shed additional
light on the nature of the phase transition at α = αc(T ) and the system state for
α < αc(T ).
10.2. The Impact of Truncating the Kramers-Moyal Expansion
Initially, in [11], the KM expansion was truncated after the Liouville term, leading to
deterministic microscopic laws. In [15, 17] it was truncated after the Fokker-Planck
term. The question we turn to now is: what is the effect of such truncations, assuming
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one would have taken the correct diffusion matrix (i.e. both terms (23) and (24)) ?
This question is even more relevant in view of the fact that, for additive noise, the
exact equations (75,77,78), which give the stationary solution in the ergodic regime, are
identical to those found earlier in [11].
If we trace back our derivations, we find that the effect of truncating the KM
expansion after the deterministic term or after the Fokker-Planck term is to replace the
function φ in (46) by
φDet[{x, w}, u] = eδ
∑
t
iwt(u+xt), (88)
or by
φFP[{x, w}, u] = eδ
∑
t
iwt(u+xt)− 14 η˜δ
∑
t
w2t (u+xt)
2
, (89)
respectively. It turns out that both expressions can be written in the form (46), i.e.
φ[{x, w}, u] =
〈
e
1
2
iη˜
∑
t
ntwt[u+xt]
〉
n
, (90)
〈f [n1, n2, . . .]〉n =
∑
n1,n2...≥0
[∏
s
P2δ/η˜[ns] f [n1, n2, . . .]
]
(91)
but with alternative definitions for the statistics of the random variables {nt}:
Deterministic : Pa[n] = δ[n− a] (92)
Fokker−Planck : Pa[n] = e
− 1
2
(n−a)2/a
√
2πa
(93)
Both truncations can thus be seen as approximations of the true (Poisson) distribution
which describes the noise due to random information selection: in the deterministic
case one replaces the true P2δ/η˜[n] by a delta-distribution with the correct first moment
〈n〉 = 2δ/η˜, in the Fokker-Planck case one replaces the true P2δ/η˜[n] by a Gaussian
distribution and ensures that the first twomoments 〈n〉 = 2δ/η˜ and 〈n2〉 = (2δ/η˜)2+2δ/η˜
are correct. The above representation allows us to continue with our original derivation,
in spite of the truncations, right up to and including the equations describing the
effective single trader process (62,63,64), since the choice made for Pa[n] only affects the
kernels R(t, t′) and Σ(t, t′). The derivation of expression (65), however, only involved
the first moment of Pa[n] (see section 6), so both truncations would have led to the
exact expression for R(t, t′). Surprisingly, the derivation of (66) only involved the first
two moments of Pa[n], so whereas the deterministic truncation would have led to an
incorrect expression for the covariance matrix Σ(t, t′) (obtained by putting η˜ → 0 in
(66)), the Fokker-Planck approximation would have led to the correct expression (66)
and hence to the exact dynamical order parameter equations.
This explains why such truncations, although not a priori justified, here can lead
to correct results. The deterministic theory would lead at most to correct equations
in ergodic stationary states (where the learning rate of (66) drops out), but would
fail to describe dynamical properties. The Fokker-Planck truncation would lead to the
correct macroscopic dynamical theory, provided one uses the correct diffusion matrix,
because the relevant order parameters of the present model fortunately turn out not to
be sensitive to the (weak) non-Gaussian fluctuations.
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10.3. Approximations of the Volatility
Since the volatility (79) involves non-persistent order parameters (describing correlations
over short temporal separations, even in the stationary state), it could not be calculated
directly in any of the previous studies. Instead one had to resort to approximations.
We repeat an argument here which was first given in [10], and which applies in the
ergodic α > αc(T ) regime. Upon assuming that phase space is sampled ergodically by
the process, one may replace the time and pattern presentation averages by an average
over the equilibrium probability measure:
σ2 =
[〈
1
p
∑
µ
〈Aµ[q, z]2〉z
〉]
dis
, (94)
The decision noise average factorizes over sites, i.e. 〈σ[qi, zi]σ[qj , zj]〉z =
〈σ[qi, zi]〉z〈σ[qj, zj ]〉z for i 6= j (this is not an approximation). It was subsequently
argued that in ergodic states the mean field character of the system means that also
the ensemble average factorizes over sites, i.e. 〈σ[qi, zi]σ[qj , zj]〉 = 〈σ[qi, zi]〉〈σ[qj, zj ]〉 for
i 6= j. This should be regarded as an approximation, since, although for large N non-
diagonal correlations can be assumed weak, they are also N in number and therefore
cannot simply be discarded. The result of this mean field approximation is:
σ2 ≈ 1
p
∑
µ
[
〈〈Aµ〉z〉2
]
dis
+
1
p
∑
µ
1
N
∑
i
[
ξµi ξ
µ
i
{
1− 〈〈σ[qi, z]〉z〉2
}]
dis
,
=
1
p
∑
µ
[
〈〈Aµ〉z〉2
]
dis
+
1
2
[
1− 1
N
∑
i
〈〈σ[qi, z]〉z〉2
]
dis
+O(N−1/2) (95)
which then leads, in the ergodic regime and for additive decision noise, more or less
directly to
σ2 ≈ 1
2
1 + c
(1 + χ)2
+
1
2
(1− c), (96)
which is equation (87). This identification shows that the exactness or otherwise
of the (traditional) approximation (96) is crucially linked to the question of under
which conditions non-persistent parts of dynamic order parameters can be ‘transformed
away’ in ergodic non-equilibrium models (see section 9). It also emphasizes that
such approximations must fail in the α < αc(T ) regime, since in equilibrium systems
such procedures are based on fluctuation-dissipation theorems and therefore typically
reproduce the replica-symmetric solution.
Numerical evidence presented in [11, 12] shows that (96) is a very good
approximation in the α > αc(T ) region, until just above the transition point αc(T ).
It is not clear whether the slight discrepancy just above αc(T ) is due to insufficient
equilibration in the simulation, or because the approximation breaks down.
10.4. Relation with the Dynamical Solution of the Batch MG
Finally, comparison shows that the present dynamical solution (62,63,64) for the on-line
MG can be regarded as a straightforward continuous-time equivalent of the discrete-
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time dynamical solution of the batch MG [20, 21], obtained simply by substituting time
derivatives for discrete differences and integral kernels for matrices, for any type of
decision noise. The only real difference is in the occurrence of the learning rate η˜ in
(66) (which makes sense, since it reflects fluctuations relating to the random choice of
external information, which are absent by definition in the batch models), which will
be responsible for differences between batch and on-line MG models in the transients
and in the non-ergodic region. This learning rate term, however, does not affect the
stationary state solution for α > αc(T ), which explains why the stationary state of the
batch models [20, 21] and the locations αc(T ) of their ergodicity-breaking transitions
were identical to those found earlier (by others) for the on-line MG.
11. Discussion
In this paper we have solved the dynamics of the on-line minority game (MG), with
general types of decision noise (including additive and multiplicative decision noise as
specific choices). We have done so by following the successful approach which also
recently led to the exact solution of discrete-time batch versions of the MG [20, 21]
(i.e. the application of generating functional techniques a la De Dominicis [19]), and
we have dealt with the problems relating to temporal regularization, which occur only
in on-line MG’s, using the (exact) procedure of [18]. The end result is a macroscopic
dynamical theory in the form of closed equations for correlation- and response functions
(the dynamical order parameters of the problem) which are defined via an effective
continuous-time single-trader process. These equations are exact for N →∞ (where N
denotes the number traders), and they incorporate all static and dynamic properties of
the on-line MG, both in the ergodic and in the non-ergodic regime.
We have used our theory to resolve a number of open problems related to
approximations and assumptions made in previous studies. For instance, we show why it
is in principle not allowed to truncate the Kramers-Moyal expansion of the microscopic
process after the Fokker-Planck term (let alone after the flow term), but why upon
doing so one can for the present version of the MG still find the correct macroscopic
equations, we confirm that the different diffusion matrices for the Fokker-Planck term
in the process as proposed earlier by others are incomplete or approximate, and we
indicate how previously proposed approximations involving the market volatility can be
traced back to assumptions relating to ergodicity.
The macroscopic theory now available is not only exact, but also more
comprehensive than its on-line predecessors: it deals with the full dynamics (with statics
included as a by-product), and it generalizes the class of decision noise definitions.
We also hope that our theory will end the discussions about which are the correct
microscopic equations for the MG, and that it can be used in future as the canonical
starting point for both analyses and generalizations (e.g. dynamics in the non-ergodic
regime, or using the real market history as external information as originally proposed
in [1]), and for approximations (for which there is still a need, since it is generally a
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non-trivial task to solve our macroscopic laws). This might well include some of the
approximations which have already been proposed earlier, which can now be provided
with transparent interpretations and with a guide for systematic improvement.
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